It is known [5] that an additively -approximate Nash equilibrium (with supports of size at most two) can be computed in polynomial time in any 2-player game with = .5. It is also known that no approximation better than .5 is possible unless equilibria with support larger than log n are considered, where n is the number of strategies per player. We give a polynomial algorithm for computing an -approximate Nash equilibrium in 2-player games with ≈ .38; our algorithm computes equilibria with arbitrarily large supports.
INTRODUCTION
It was recently shown that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete [4] , even for 2-player games [2] . As a consequence, finding approximate Nash equilibria has emerged as the main remaining open question in the area of equilibrium computation. The most commonly studied form of approximation is additive approximation in games in which all utilities have been normalized to be between 0 and 1 (this is a common assumption, since scaling the utilities of a player by any positive factor, and applying any additive constant, results in an equivalent game). A set of mixed strategies is called an -approximate Nash equilibrium, where > 0, if 3 4 -approximate Nash equilibrium in 2-player games by examining all supports of size two; see [8] for a slightly improved result. In [9] it was shown that an -approximate Nash equilibrium can be found in time O(n log n 2 ) by examining all supports of size log n 2 . It was pointed out in [1] that no algorithm that examines supports smaller than about log n can achieve an approximation better than 1 4 , even for zero-sum games. In fact [6] have sharpened the 1 4 to a 1 2 . A very simple algorithm achieving = 1 2 in 2-person games was pointed out in [5] : For any strategy i of player I let j be the best response of player II, and let k be the best response of player I to j. Then player I plays an equal mixture of i and k, while player II plays j. The proof of -approximation is not very hard. In this paper we give an algorithm which breaks the barrier of 1 2 by considering supports of arbitrarily large cardinality. It achieves an approximation ratio
. It is based on the following two ideas: (a) If the values (u, v) of a Nash equilibrium to the two players were known, then we would be able to find a max{u, v}-approximate Nash equilibrium by solving a set of linear inequalities; and (b) for every Nash equilibrium, there is a pair of mixed strategies with support size O( 1 2 ) which approximates within the true values of that Nash equilibrium [9] . Our technique uses both these ideas and also takes care of the interaction between them. The linear program in (a) will, of course, return in general mixed strategies of arbitrarily large support.
PRELIMINARIES
We consider normal form games between two players, the row player and the column player, each with n strategies at his disposal. The game is defined by two n × n payoff matrices, R for the row player, and C for the column player. The pure strategies of the row player correspond to the n rows and the pure strategies of the column player correspond to the n columns. If the row player plays row i and the column player plays column j, then the row player receives a payoff of Rij and the column player gets Cij. Payoffs are extended linearly to pairs of mixed strategies -if the row player plays a probability distribution x over the rows and column player plays a distribution y over the columns, then the row player gets a payoff of x T Ry and the column player gets a payoff of x T Cy. A Nash equilibrium in this setting is a pair of mixed strategies, x * for the row player and y * for the column player, such that neither player has an incentive to unilaterally defect. Note that, by linearity, the best defection is to a pure strategy. Let ei denote the vector with a 1 at the ith coordinate and 0 elsewhere. A pair of mixed strategies (x * , y * ) is a Nash equilibrium if
It can be easily shown that every pair of equilibrium strategies of a game does not change upon multiplying all the entries of a payoff matrix by a constant, and upon adding the same constant to each entry. We shall therefore assume that the entries of both payoff matrices R and C are between 0 and 1.
For > 0, we define an -approximate Nash equilibrium to be a pair of mixed strategies x * for the row player and y * for the column player, so that the incentive to unilaterally deviate is at most :
A stronger notion of approximately equilibrium strategies was introduced in [7, 4] : For > 0, a well-supportedapproximate Nash equilibrium, or an -well-supported Nash equilibrium, is a pair of mixed strategies, x * for the row player and y * for the column player, so that a player plays only approximately best-response pure strategies with nonzero probability:
This is indeed a stronger definition, in the sense that every -well supported Nash equilibrium is also an -approximate Nash equilibrium, but the converse need not be true. However, the following lemma from [3] shows that there does exist a polynomial relationship between the two: It is known, see [4, 2, 3] , that computing an 1 n α -well supported Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete, for any constant α > 0, and, by the above lemma, so is computing a 1 n α+1 -approximate equilibrium. Therefore, a FPTAS for the problem is unlikely. In [5] we provide an algorithm for computing a 1 2 -approximate Nash equilibrium via a simple algorithm which considers strategies of support 2 and an algorithm for computing a 2 3 -well supported equilibrium conditional on some graph theoretic conjecture. Another attempt towards computing approximate equilibria (although with inferior approximation guarantees) can be found in [8] .
COMPUTATION OF APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIA

An Existence Proof
Using the properties of Nash equilibrium and HoefdingChernoff bounds we derive the following. 
Proof. Let (x * , y * ) be a Nash equilibrium of game G and let vR = x * T Ry * , vC = x * T Cy * be the values obtained by the two players in the Nash equilibrium. Let us choose x = x * and y = y * . We will argue that there exists a pair of mixed strategies α, β for the row and column player respectively so that the required properties hold.
To show that such strategies exist we apply the probabilistic method. Suppose that we take t independent samples from the strategy space of the row player according to the distribution induced by x * and let us denote by A the resulting multiset of pure strategies of the row player. Similarly, let us take t samples according to y * and denote by B the resulting multiset for the column player. Let then α be the mixed strategy corresponding to the uniform distribution on multiset A and β the mixed strategy corresponding to the uniform distribution on B.
We are interested in the probability that x, y, α and β satisfy the properties stated above. Clearly, Properties (2), (4), (6), (8) are satisfied with probability 1 by the definition of Nash equilibrium and since every strategy in A is in the support of x and every strategy in B in the support of y. So we only need to worry about Properties (1), (3), (5) and (7) .
Let X and Y be independent random variables such that X = ei, with probability x(i), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Y = ei, with probability y(i), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. 
Yi we will argue that with positive probability the random variables A and B satisfy Properties (1), (3), (5) and (7), i.e.
È[(|A
Via similar arguments
To bound the probability of the event |A T RB − vR| > we note that
Therefore,
The second term of the latter expression can be bounded as follows from (10) È[|x
To bound the first term we note that [X
T RB. Therefore, conditioned on the value of B, a Chernoff bound on the sequence of random variables
which implies
Putting everything together we get
Similarly,
Choosing t =
Therefore, by union bound
The latter implies (9) . This completes the proof. We note that (1) and (5) were also proved to be true in [9] using a similar method.
An Algorithm
Let > 0. The following algorithm computes an (b) Find a multiset A of row player's pure strategies, and a multiset B of column player's pure strategies, both multisets of size 4/ 2 so that the following is satisfied.
where α, respectively β, is the uniform distribution on the elements of the multiset A, respectively B.
(c) Find x, a mixed strategy for the row player, and y, a mixed strategy for the column player, as any solution of the following linear program So it remains to determine the value of the approximation. Define valR, valC as the values obtained by the row and column player (resp.) in the solution output by the algorithm. Define defR, defC as the maximum value that the player can get by defecting to some pure strategy. Thus our algorithm outputs a max{defR −valR, defC −valC} approximate equilibrium. The analysis is in two cases.
In the easy case, when vmax < 1/3, the algorithm outputs (x, y). By (14), we see that defR ≤ vR + /2 < 1/3 + /2. Similarly defC < 1/3 + /2. Since valR, valC ≥ 0, we have a 1/3 + /2 approximate equilibrium.
In the case when vmax ≥ 1/3, we have, from (11), (13) and (15) 
